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Informational Privacy Under the Open
Records Act
I.

Introduction

An element essential to the vitality of a democracy is its citizens' ability to obtain information on the workings of their government. Georgia
citizens are guaranteed access to all state, county, and municipal public
records by the "Open Records Act."' In recent years, many individuals
and groups, especially the news media, have resorted to this statute in
order to gain access to government records. The records sought have been
outside the categories of traditional courthouse records such as land titles
and mortgages, and have consisted of documents such as ambulance
records of a hospital authority,' records of a public housing authority,' or
a departmental evaluation report commissioned by a state university.' As
a result, Georgia courts have had to reexamine and expand their traditional definition of "public records."
These cases also brought another complex issue before the courts. The
same statute that grants Georgia citizens access to public records also
places restrictions on that right. For example, one category of public
records which cannot be disclosed is within that group "the disclosure of
which would be an invasion of personal privacy."5 In light of the burgeoning amount of personal data collected by the government on individuals, this statutory exception gives the individual a resource to prevent
indiscriminate release of personal information to the public.
Legislative recognition of this concept of "informational privacy"' is a
reflection of the historic treatment by Georgia lawmakers of the right of
privacy as a fundamental right. Before any other state or federal court
had recognized the right of privacy, the Supreme Court of Georgia had
declared, "The right of privacy within certain limits is a right derived
from natural law, recognized by the principles of municipal law, and guar1. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2701 to 2703 (1975).
2. Griffin-Spalding County Hosp. Auth. v. Radio Station WKEU, 240 Ga. 444, 241
S.E.2d-196 (1978).
3. Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga.'83, 263 S.E.2d 119 (1980).
4. Athens Observer, Inc. v. Anderson, 245 Ga. 63, 263 S.E.2d 128 (1980).
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2703 (1975).
6. The concept of informational privacy is discussed in Note, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 273
(1976).
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anteed to persons in this State by the constitutions of the United States

and of the State of Georgia.

. .

. "7

These two factors, increasing clamor

for access to new categories of government records, and Georgians' historic insistence upon a fundamental right of privacy, have come into conflict in several cases recently decided under the Open Records Act. The
purpose of this comment will be to examine the Georgia Supreme Court's
position with regard to these competing policy goals. By adhering to an
expanded definition of public records and by adhering to a narrow interpretation of the parameters of the right of privacy, the court has made a
policy choice that favors increased access to public records over the individual's right of privacy.
II.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The right of privacy was first recognized as a fundamental right in
Georgia and in the United States 8 in a landmark opinion written by Justice Andrew J. Cobb in 1905. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.,9 plaintiff sought damages from an insurance company, its agent, and
a photographer for libel and for invasion of privacy.10 The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action in seeking damages for
invasion of privacy."
In the first part of his brilliantly reasoned opinion, Justice Cobb justified recognition of the right of privacy, in spite of an absence of precedent
in Georgia case law, by asserting that, "such absence, even for all time, is
not conclusive of the question as to the existence of the right.' 2 The two
most important questions, he said, were whether the plaintiff had suffered "an injury cognizable by law"'" and whether the case was not new
in principle, but was instead merely "an application of a recognized principle to a new case."1
Justice Cobb answered both questions in the affirmative, finding the
origin of the concept in ancient sources.' He found one origin of the right
7. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197, 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905).
8. Pember, The Burgeoning Scope of "Access Privacy" and the Portent for a Free
Press, 64 IowA L. REv. 1155, 1156 (1979).
9. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
10. Id. at 192, 50 S.E. at 69 (The suit resulted from publication by the Atlanta Constitution of an unauthorized photograph of plaintiff in an advertisement).
11. Id. at 216, 50 S.E. at 79.
12. Id. at 193, 50 S.E. at 69.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 194, 50 S.E. at 69.
15. Id. at 194-95, 50 S.E. at 69-70 (Justice Cobb stated that the right of privacy was
embraced by Roman law, and that the principle could also be deduced from the writings of
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of privacy in natural law, the right of privacy being one of those liberties
obtained in a state of nature and retained by the individual when he or
she surrenders other rights for the good of society. 6 The right was also
said to be derived from both the state and federal constitutions "in those
provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law."'" Another provision protecting the right of
privacy, according to Justice Cobb, is "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, which is so fully protected in the constitutions of the United
States and of this State."' 8
After elaborating on the historical precedent for recognizing a right of
privacy, Justice Cobb then defined the limits of that right. One such limit
was said to exist in the doctrine of waiver. The right of privacy may be
waived generally or for a limited purpose and the waiver may be either
express or implied. ' 9 Examples were given of a candidate for public office,
a public office holder, and a member of the learned professions, all of
whom allow the public to scrutinize their otherwise private affairs to de20
termine their qualification to serve the public.
Another parameter of the right exists in the obligation of publicity for
the public welfare, an obligation insured by the rights of free speech and
' 22
freedom of the press.2 ' Each may be used "as a check upon the other
and "[iun many cases the law require[s] the individual to surrender some
of his natural and private rights for the benefit of the public; and this is
true in reference to some phases of the right of privacy as well as other
legal rights."2
Applying these principles to the facts, Justice Cobb found that plaintiff's privacy had been invaded and that none of the limits on the right
were applicable in this instance. 2 ' With great foresight, he summarized
that "the law recognizes within proper limits, as a legal right, the right of
privacy. . . we venture to predict that the day will come that the American Bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges

Sir William Blackstone).
16. Id. at 194, 50 S.E. at 70.
17. Id. at 197, 50 S.E. at 71. The current provisions are contained in GA. CONST. art. I, §
1, 1, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-101 (1977), and in U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. Id. at 198, 50 S.E. at 71. The current provisions are contained in GA. CONST. art. I, §
1, 1 10, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-110 (1977), and in U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Id. at 199, 50 S.E. at 72.
20. Id. at 199-200, 50 S.E. at 72.
21. Id. at 201-05, 50 S.E. at 73-74.
22. Id. at 205, 50 S.E. at 74.
23. Id. at 204-05, 50 S.E. at 74.
24. Id. at 217, 50 S.E. at 79.
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of eminence and ability. . .. "25
Decisions over the next seventy-five years proved that Justice Cobb's
recognition of the right of privacy was not an isolated judicial event. The
idea was so well established that in 1939 the Georgia Court of Appeals
could state, "Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions as to the
right of. . . privacy it has been definitely settled in this State that such a
right exists."" However, despite repeated acknowledgement of the soundness of Justice Cobb's opinion, the judicial trend in Georgia has been to
emphasize the limiting aspects of the decision in Pavesich rather than
those aspects which made positive additions to the right of privacy.
An example of this tendency to restrict the right of privacy is illustrated in the cases involving lawsuits by debtors against creditors for invasion of privacy because of collection techniques. One typical case was
Davis v. General Finance and Thrift Corp.,2 7 in which the alleged invasion of privacy was the publication of a telegram by the defendant-creditor threatening legal action against plaintiff for a debt. The Georgia
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had stated no cause of action for
an invasion of privacy.2 8 Citing the famous article by Warren and Brandeis29 which had been quoted in Pavesich, the court stated: "This right to
sue for a violation of the right of privacy is one of recent origin and has
been very much restricted from the beginning." 30 Another reason for denying plaintiff relief was that the right of privacy must be restricted to
protect only ordinary sensibilities and not supersensitiveness because
"[tihere are some shocks, inconveniences and annoyances which members
of society in the nature of things must absorb without the right of

redress. "31
A more graphic illustration of the direction in which the appellate
courts were headed was given in Waters v. Fleetwood. s In this rather
sensational case, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's action to enjoin commercial sale of a photograph of
a murder victim.8 2 The appellate court concurred with opinions of other
jurisdictions which had held that publication in connection with matters

25. Id. at 220, 50 S.E. at 81.
26. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 99, 2 S.E.2d 810, 815
(1939).
27. 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950).
28. Id. at 710, 57 S.E.2d at 226-27.
29. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
30. 80 Ga. App. 710, 57 S.E.2d at 227.
31. Id. at 711, 57 S.E.2d at 227.
32. 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956).
33. Id. at 168, 91 S.E.2d at 348. (The subject of the photograph was the unrecognizable
mutilated body of plaintiff's fourteen year-old daughter).
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of public interest could be a violation of no one's legal right of privacy.
The court observed that this murder was a subject of public interest and
a matter of public investigation and, therefore, the newspaper could not
be prohibited from disseminating photographic information about the incident on the basis that plaintiff's privacy was being invaded.35
Cabaniss v. Hipsleys6 was one of the few cases since Pavesich to add
any positive substance to the law of privacy in Georgia. Like Pavesich,
Cabaniss dealt with the unauthorized use by defendant of a photograph
of plaintiff.8 7 Judge Eberhardt of the Georgia Court of Appeals clarified
the law as to the right of privacy in Georgia by the same method as had
Justice Cobb in Pavesich-he incorporated the theories of an eminent legal scholar, Dean Prosser.' s Judge Eberhardt adopted Prosser's four categories of torts which constitute an invasion of privacy."9 Judge Eberhardt
analyzed the facts in light of these categories
and also classified preceding
40
Georgia cases as far back as Pavesich.
But despite his listing additional situations where the right of privacy
might be applicable, Judge Eberhardt eventually based his holding on
one of the limiting features of the law. Finding that the matters disclosed
by defendant had previously been made public by plaintiff, plaintiff's
case failed on the theory that defendant had disclosed embarrassing private facts about plaintiff.41 Citing Pavesich on waiver of the right of privacy, Judge Eberhardt agreed with Justice Cobb and with Warren and
Brandeis that, "to whatever degree . . . a man's life has ceased to be private, to that extent the protection is to be withdrawn." '
A recent decision made explicit the negative attitude of the courts toward enlarging the bounds of the right of privacy. In Hines v. Columbus
Bank and Trust Co.,4 a bank officer had written a letter to the United
States ambassador to Costa Rica requesting information on the plaintiff
for one of its customers." Plaintiff, who was not a bank customer,
34. Id. at 163-67, 91 S.E.2d at 346-48.
35. Id. at 167, 91 S.E. 2d at 348.
36. 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966).
37. Id. at 368-69, 151 S.E.2d at 499. Plaintiff, a strip-tease dancer, had unsuccessfully
sought to prohibit distribution of a revealing portrait of herself by claiming the display of
the photograph amounted to an invasion of privacy. Id.
38. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960).
39. The four groupings consisted of: 1) intrusions upon plaintiff's seclusion; 2) public
disclosure of embarrassing facts about plaintiff; 3) publicity placing plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye; and 4) appropriation for the defendant's advantage of plaintiff's name or
likeness. Id. at 389.
40. 114 Ga. App. at 371-78, 151 S.E.2d at 500-04.
41. Id. at 370, 151 S.E.2d at 501-02.
42. Id. at 374, 151 S.E.2d at 502, quoting, Warren and Brandeis, supra note 29, at 215.
43. 137 Ga. App. 268, 223 S.E.2d 468 (1976).
44. Id. at 268, 223 S.E.2d at 469 (The information was to be used in a lawsuit against
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brought an action for invasion of privacy against the bank."' The issue
was whether or not the court should extend the right of privacy to create
a cause of action based on these facts. 6 The court replied with a negative
answer based
on "[flaw, logic, and the practicalities of modern
47
commerce."
The court characterized the right of privacy as a judge-made tort and
balanced the right against the necessities of commerce.4 8 Citing Davis and
the Warren-Brandeis article, the court held that "the courts should not
interfere with the established business practice whereby inquiries are
made to get information concerning activities, reputation, and financial
responsibility-provided it is sought legitimately and not for a malevolent
purpose.'"4 Judge Quillian disagreed that the issue was whether or not
plaintiff had stated a cause of action in her complaint. Rather, he said the
issue was whether plaintiff's complaint disclosed with certainty that
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any proveable state of facts
which would support plaintiff's claim.50 The conclusion reached by Judge
Quillian was that plaintiff should not be precluded from recovery "[s]ince
the defendants requested information about the plaintiff they may not
escape responsibility for the manner in which it was obtained or the harm
thereby caused by delegating to another the job of obtaining such
information." 1
III.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY UNDER THE OPEN

RECORDS ACT

A.

Early Judicial Interpretation

Georgia's Open Records Act"' became law in 1959. In the original version of the act, the only exception to the disclosure requirements was for
"those [records], which by order of a court of this State or by law, are
prohibited from being open to inspection by the general public. ' 53 The
provision exempting records from disclosure when the result would be an
invasion of privacy did not become a part of the act until added as an

plaintiff).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 270, 223 S.E.2d at 470.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 273, 223 S.E.2d at 468 (Quillian, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 273-74, 223 S.E.2d at 472.
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2701 (1975).
53. Id.
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amendment in 1967."
The statute had been in effect for seventeen years before it generated
any major case law." The first case to deal with the statute in any significant way was Houston v. Rutledge,56 decided in 1976. An action was
brought by representatives of two newspapers to require a sheriff to release records concerning the death of inmates.5 7 The significance of the
holding in Houston was twofold.58 First the court issued its initial definition of a public record under the act. The court rejected defendant's argument that the records were not public records because no law required
the sheriff to make or keep them. 5' Rather, the court said, the records
were of a public nature merely because they "were prepared and are
maintained by the sheriff, or at his direction, in the ordinary course and
operation of this public office." 60 With this expansive definition of public
records the court laid the foundation upon which later decisions dealing
with the right of privacy would be based.
The second significant aspect of the holding was the establishment of a
balancing test to decide whether public records should be disclosed.1 The
courts would be required to balance the "interest of the public in favor of
inspection against the interest of the public in favor of non-inspection."'
This balancing test was also to become a cornerstone of future decisions
under the act.
The next open records case which had any bearing on informational
privacy was Griffin-Spalding County Hospital Authority v. Radio Station WKEU,"3 in which the Georgia Supreme Court made its initial encounter with the statutory privacy exception . 4 Plaintiff, a radio station,
sought disclosure of ambulance records of the defendant hospital authority.6 5 The hospital authority argued in the trial court that since the
records contained private information (patients' medical histories) interspersed with public information, none of the records could be released
without invading patients' privacy." The trial court solved this dilemma
54.
55.
(1978).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2703 (1975).
Sentell, The Omen of "Openness" in Local Government Law, 13 GA. L. REv. 97, 125
237 Ga. 764, 229 S.E.2d 624 (1976).
Id.
Sentell, supra note 55, at 127.
237 Ga. at 765, 229 S.E.2d at 626.
Id.
Sentell, supra note 55, at 126.
237 Ga. at 765, 229 S.E.2d at 626.
240 Ga. 444, 241 S.E.2d 196 (1978).
Sentell, supra note 55, at 129.
240 Ga. at 444, 241 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 445, 241 S.E.2d at 198.
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by ordering the authority to maintain two sets of records, one containing
only non-private information which could then be legally disclosed. 7
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the private information should not be released, but disagreed as to the method for protecting patients' privacy. The court said that to require two sets of
records to be kept was inconsistent with the statute." The authority was
ordered to expunge from existing records any information the public had
no right to see. 9 In discussing the financial burden of this requirement,
the court emphasized the importance of the privacy exception by noting
the vulnerability of the hospital to liability for invasion of privacy if a
mistake was made in separating the information."0
B. Later Decisions: The Informational Privacy Issue Emerges
The Georgia Supreme Court has had the opportunity to delineate the
scope of the privacy exception to the Open Records Act in a series of
cases decided since Houston and Griffin-Spalding. In dealing with The
issue, the trend has been for the court to restrict the dimensions of the
right of privacy and to refuse to apply the right to situations where informational privacy is at stake. The court has thus followed the line of postPavesich decisions that focused on the limits of the right of privacy.
In Northside Realty Associates, Inc. v. Community Relations Commission71 the privacy issue was dealt with only indirectly, but that decision
established a pleading rule which has had a major bearing on the limits of
the privacy exception. Plaintiffs sought disclosure of Commission records
regarding compliance with the Federal Fair Housing Act.72 The trial court
ruled that as to four of the items, plaintiffs had no right to demand disclosure because the items contained no information relating to plaintiffs. 73 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed that ruling by holding that
Georgia citizens need not show any special interest in public records to be
entitled to copy and inspect them. "
The portion of the holding in Northside which affected the privacy issue was the appellate court's rule as to the allocation of the burden of
proof in cases in which there was a demand for disclosure. Adopting the
concurring opinion of Justice Ingram in Houston v. Rutledge,"' the court
67.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 447, 241 S.E.2d at 199.
Id.
Id.

71.
72.
73.
74.

240 Ga. 432, 241 S.E.2d 189 (1978).
Id. at 433, 241 S.E.2d at 190.
Id. at 434, 241 S.E.2d at 190.
Id. at 435, 241 S.E.2d at 191.

68.

75. 237 Ga. at 766-67, 229 S.E.2d at 627.
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in Northside stated, "if it is found that the appellants have made a request for identifiable public records within the appellees' possession, the
burden is cast on the appellees to explain why the records should not be
furnished. 7' The policy basis for allocating the burden to the record
holder was alluded to in the concurring opinion in Houston:
[U]nless the sheriff on remand can show some persuasive reason why the
files should not now be made available for public inspection, I believe we
have a duty under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Code Ann. § 40-2701 to require 7the
files to be made available for
7
public inspection without further delay.
The court in Northside thus gave its strong support to the policy favoring disclosure of government records over the informational privacy interests which arise in these situations. This was accomplished by the formulation of a rule of evidence which is weighted in favor of plaintiffs in cases
where the plaintiff is requesting disclosure. The holder of the records now
bears the burden of persuading the fact-finder as to the reasons why the
records should not be released, including the invasion of privacy defense.
If the record keeper cannot carry this burden, the records must be released. Adding to the difficulty of the record keeper's task is the fact that
a record keeper, as defendant, will usually be arguing for an interest that
exists outside himself. The defendant will be arguing for a right of informational privacy that exists in the subjects of the records, subjects who
are frequently not even parties to the action. As a result, the record
keeper may not be wholly committed to protecting the private information in the records.
In 1980, the Georgia Supreme Court proved that indirect means were
not the only judicial resources for dealing with the privacy exception to
the Open Records Act. Two cases were decided in which the informational privacy issue had been brought squarely before the court. In its
decisions the court made explicit its resistance to expansion of the right
of privacy into the area of informational privacy.
Doe v. Sears's was an action brought by an editor of an Atlanta newspaper to require disclosure of records of the Atlanta Housing Authority
(AHA) which contained names, addresses, and income information of
public housing tenants." AHA and intervening tenants argued that release of the records would constitute an invasion of tenants' privacy, but
the trial court disagreed and ordered disclosure. The lower court held
76. 240 Ga. at 436, 241 S.E.2d at 191.
77. 237 Ga. at 766-67, 229 S.E.2d at 627 (Ingram, J., concurring).
78. 245 Ga. 83,'263 S.E.2d 119 (1980).
79. Id. at 84, 263 S.E.2d at 121 (The request was made as part of an investigation of
political favoritism).
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that tenants whose rent was six months past due had waived their right
of privacy. 8
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. The court found
AHA to be a public body created by statute to exercise "public and essential government functions."' The property of AHA is public property
and AHA housing constitutes a "public use and purpose for which public
monies are spent."'" Since AHA is a public body, the court found its
records to be necessarily subject to the disclosure requirements of the act,
unless the records are the object of a specific statutory exception. 8
The court found no such applicable exceptions. Specifically, the right of
privacy was no barrier to disclosure." Although the parties had requested
the court to "delimit with precision the full extent of the federal and
state constitutional rights of privacy, if any, and state statutory and common law rights of privacy, if any, as to the tenants' rent accounts with
AHA," ' the court declined the invitation. The court concluded that it
was unnecessary to decide the full extent of the tenants' rights of privacy
and the court instead applied the doctrine of waiver of right."
The court cited Pavesich for the principle that the right of privacy may
be expressly or impliedly waived. 87 The court then gave as one example
the debtor-creditor situation in Davis where the court had held that a
debtor impliedly waived his or her right of privacy to obtain credit and to
allow the creditor to collect." From this holding, the court in Sears deduced the principle that a tenant in default under a lease impliedly consents to reasonable and necessary disclosures of his arrearage and
financial condition to persons who are properly concerned with the status
of the rental account. 89 The court then declared that the general public
has a legitimate concern with the rent payment patterns of public housing tenants."
The addition of the AHA to the courts' list of public bodies whose files
are public records diminishes the scope of the right of privacy. The court
in Sears issued an expanded definition of public records which was a direct heritage from Houston v. Rutledge.9" Like the court in Houston, the

80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 85, 263 S.E.2d at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87-88, 263 S.E.2d at 122-23.
Id. at 86, 263 S.E.2d at 122.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 87, 263 S.E.2d at 122.
Id. at 87, 263 S.E.2d at 123.
245 Ga. at 87, 263 S.E.2d at 123.
Id.

91.

237 Ga. 764, 229 S.E.2d 624 (1976).
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court in Sears looked not at the nature of the records to classify them as
public or private, but instead looked to the nature of the office in which
the records were prepared. Although the court enumerated a long list of
factors which served to make AHA a public body, 9" the court made no
equivalent inquiry into the public or private nature of the records' contents. The court merely assumed that because the records were created in
a public office, they had to be public records.
In making this assumption, the court ignored the possibility that certain records, even if compiled in a public office, may contain private information. Of course, such private information may still be protected
from disclosure by the statutory privacy exception. But the import of the
holding in Sears is that the plaintiff in a disclosure action is not required
to prove that the records he is seeking from a public office are public
records. The court makes that assumption for the plaintiff. Like the holding in Northside, the effect of the holding in Sears is to cast an additional
pleading burden upon the defendant, who must now distinguish between
public and private records created in a public office.
The court in Sears created another impediment to expansion of the
right of informational privacy when it relied upon the waiver doctrine.
The court made the illogical statement that employment of the waiver
doctrine meant it was not compelled to decide the full extent of the tenants' rights of privacy.9 The court felt itself sufficiently prepared to explain how the tenants had given up their privacy rights without the necessity of first defining just what those rights were. A more logical process
would have been for the court to delineate the extent of tenants' privacy
rights first, then to proceed to deciding the waiver issue. The holding
leaves the door open for even more extensive applications of the waiver
doctrine in future cases at the expense of privacy rights. By explaining
more clearly the exact extent of the privacy rights involved here, the
court could have avoided setting this dubious precedent.
In quoting Pavesich, the court noted that the right of privacy may be
waived in whole or in part.9 The court also noted that the limits of the
waiver doctrine as set forth in Pavesich meant that "the law continues to
protect a person's right of privacy to whatever extent it has not been
waived.

'95

But the discussion of the idea of partial waiver ended there.

The court set no specific limits as to how far plaintiff's inquiry into
AHA's records could go before becoming an invasion of privacy. The
court spoke only in general terms of allowing disclosure of a tenant's "arrearage and his financial condition. . . to persons who properly are con92.
93.
94.
95.

245 Ga. at 85, 263 S.E.2d at 121-22.
Id. at 86, 263 S.E.2d at 122.
Id. at 87, 263 S.E.2d at 122.
Id.
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s" This defect in reasoning is another product of the court's

refusal to delineate the full extent of tenants' privacy rights. The court
could not effectively decide the limits of the waiver doctrine if it did not
know the full extent of the privacy rights.
In general, the decision in Sears continued the judicial encroachment
upon the right of privacy since Pavesich by expanding the waiver doctrine. In Pavesich, Justice Cobb recited only three examples of individuals who might, to a limited extent, waive their right of privacy: a candidate for public office, a member of the learned professions, or a public
office-holder.Y In Davis, the doctrine was extended to apply to persons
who obtain credit.9' In Waters, the doctrine was said to apply to the parents of a murdered child." Now, in Sears, the court has extended that
doctrine again, this time to apply to public housing tenants whose rent is
past due. In each case the application of the doctrine moved the court
further away from the original ideas of Justice Cobb. As originally expounded, the doctrine was to apply only in narrow circumstances, a
limited concept to be called upon only as necessary and proper in the
circumstances. The holding in Sears is far removed from Justice Cobb's
statement that
any person who engages in any pursuit ... which calls for approval or
patronage of the public submits his private life to examination by those
to whom he addresses his call, to any extent that may be necessary to
determine whether it is wise . . . to accord him the approval or pa-

tronage which he seeks.'"
The reasoning in Sears was reflected in Athens Observer, Inc. v. Anderson."1' An Athens, Georgia newspaper requested disclosure by the
University of Georgia under the Open Records Act of a report on the
university's mathematical sciences program.102 The trial court refused to
order disclosure, saying that the need for candid
evaluation of personnel
103
outweighed the public's right to disclosure.
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the decision and ordered disclosure.' " The court first concluded that the report was a public record
since it was commissioned by public officers and "was maintained in the
96. Id. at 87, 263 S.E.2d at 123.
97. 122 Ga. at 199-200, 50 S.E. at 72.
98. 80 Ga. App. at 711, 57 S.E.2d at 227.
99. 212 Ga. at 163-67, 91 S.E.2d at 344-48.
100. 122 Ga. at 200, 50 S.E. at 72.
101. 245 Ga. 63, 263 S.E.2d 128 (1980).
102. Id. at 63, 263 S.E.2d at 129 (The report was commissioned by the university and
made by outside consultants).

103. Id.
104. Id. at 67, 263 S.E.2d at 131.
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course of the operation of a public office,"' 5 as required by Houston v.
Rutledge. The court also found that release of the report would not
amount to an invasion of privacy. The report's subjects, university employees, were public officers and the public could legitimately inquire into
the operation of the university and its employees.'" The court reversed
the trial court's findings under the balancing test and held that non-disclosure would contravene the public policy of the state in favor of open
government.0 7
Three Justices dissented from the majority opinion. Justice Jordan,
writing for the dissenters, did not agree that the records were public
records; rather, he felt that the language of the statute in reference to
"public records" was "not broad enough to encompass all papers... of
all description.""' This report was not an official record, but consisted of
only written evaluations and opinions of outside experts. 1 "0That was not
enough to make the records "public" or to justify their release.110
The majority's classification of this report as a public record was predictable after the holdings in Houston and Sears. The court had established in those cases that its inquiry would extend only into the nature of
the office and not into the nature of the records or their contents. The
natural consequence of that reasoning was the holding in Athens which
gave a public character to documents on the periphery of the traditional
definition of public records. That a state university is a public body cannot be denied. But to classify all the documents emanating out of such an
institution as public records is a dubious and peril-laden proposition. The
characterization draws into its sweep not only records which are only
marginally public in nature, but also many other papers in which the
public may have no legitimate interest at all. A more discriminating standard for defining public records would better serve the protection of the
right of informational privacy of university officials.
The court also characterized the subjects of the reports as public officials. 1 Many state university employees would be surprised to learn they
are "public officials" performing "official duties." Undoubtedly the public
has some interest in these employees' performance since their salaries are
paid with tax dollars. But here again, as in Doe v. Sears, the court set no
precise boundaries as to the limits of the public's inquiry. A university
professor should owe less of an obligation to the public eye than most
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other public officials, for example, an elected office-holder. Dean Prosser
realized the necessity for making such a distinction when he stated,
"there is some rough proportion to be looked for, between the importance
of the public figure or the man in the news, and of the occasion for the
public interest in him, and the nature of the private facts revealed."' 12
The court in Athens made no such distinction and placed the university's employees into the same classification as any other public official.
Such a procedure contradicts the limited nature of the waiver doctrine as
contemplated by Justice Cobb in Pavesich when he stated that "the existence of the waiver carries with it the right to an invasion of privacy only
to such an extent as may be legitimately necessary and proper in dealing
with the matter which has brought about the waiver." 8 The decision in
Athens further clouds the meaning of those "necessary and proper"
limits.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In these recent cases decided under the Open Records Act, Georgia appellate courts have been confronted with competing public interests. The
interest of the public in access to government records has been set against
the individual's desire to shield himself from unnecessary public scrutiny
in matters protected under the aegis of the right of privacy. The courts
have indicated their support of the former policy by employing various
techniques to limit the effectiveness of the privacy defense to a demand
for disclosure. The courts have shifted the burden of proof on the privacy
and public records issues to the defendant, expanded the definition of
public records, and resorted to the waiver doctrine to justify granting access to new categories of public records.
The eventual impact of these decisions is a matter of speculation. Will
the courts finally reverse this trend and widen the scope of the privacy
exception? Or will the courts continue to expand application of the statute at the expense of diminishing the vitality of what was once considered
a fundamental right in Georgia? Will the Georgia courts which were once
in the forefront of judicial progress in recognizing the right of privacy
now be content to let that right wither under pressure for access to government records? Only time and future decisions will tell if the right of
privacy in Georgia law has been dealt a fatal blow.
DENNIS P. QUARLES
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